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In Search of Premises
IRVING YOUNGER*
I live in upstate New York in a house more than a century old.
Older than the house is a huge oak tree, the lower branches of
which come near touching my bedroom window. From the middle
of April to the middle of October it is impossible for me to sleep
past the moment of sunrise, for as the sun slips above the eastern
hills to kiss the night a sweet adieu, some eight or nine crows, keen
of intelligence, black of feather, and loud of voice, assemble in that
oak tree to discourse collegially on their plans for the day.
As I attempt to fathom the Supreme Court's most recent pro-
nouncement' on the closure of judicial proceedings, I cannot help
but think of those politic crows. I hear them. In a general way I
know the subject on which they make their music. But the where-
fores and the whys, the joinery by which one proposition is made
to support the next, these, alas, somehow escape me. It is as if I
were receiving a message in code, unfurnished of the key. Or, to
adopt perhaps a more lawyerlike style, I am the beneficiary of a set
of elaborate arguments resting upon premises which remain
unstated.
But enough. Let me temporize no further. Let us go to work.
Not long ago,2 two men were indicted in Seneca County, New
York, for robbery, murder, and grand larceny. They moved to sup-
press certain evidence, and a hearing was set to take testimony on
the factual questions raised by their motion. At the hearing, de-
fense counsel asked the judge to close the courtroom on the ground
that publicity would threaten his clients' right to a fair trial later,
before a jury, on the issue of guilt or innocence. The prosecutor
said that he had no objection, and the judge closed the courtroom.
The next day, the Gannett Company, which published two local
newspapers, petitioned to set aside the order of closure. Recogniz-
ing a constitutionally protected right of access by the press to judi-
cial proceedings but holding that right to be outweighed by the
defendants' right to a fair trial, the judge denied Gannett's peti-
tion.8 His order was vacated by the Appellate. Division,4 the inter-
* Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques, Cornell Law School. This article
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1. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
2. August 2, 1976. Id. at 374.
3. Id. at 376.
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mediate appellate court, which held that closure constituted a pro-
hibited prior restraint on freedom of the press. New York's highest
court, the Court of Appeals, in turn reversed the Appellate Divi-
sion,' holding that the threat to the fairness of the defendants'
trial justified the action of the trial judge. The case then went to
the United States Supreme Court, which last year, under the style
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,6 affirmed the New York Court of
Appeals.
Since it had already been settled by the Supreme Court that
the first amendment prohibits any restraint on the right of the
press to report what goes on in open court,7 the question for deci-
sion in the Gannett case was the nature and limits of a court's
power to close the courtroom in order to prevent press coverage
which might impair the fairness of the trial. Of the subject of Gan-
nett Co. v. DePasquale I am certain; of everything else about the
case, I am unsure.
No small part of my difficulty is due, doubtless, to the number
of opinions. There are five of them. Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and Justices Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, held that the sixth amendment's guar-
antee of an open trial extends to the accused, not to the public.8
For this, he gave two reasons-first, that the text of the sixth
amendment refers only to the accused, not to the public;9 second,
that in any event the public's right, if there be one, does not assure
access to pretrial proceedings,10 which is what Gannett involved.
As to whether the first amendment might engender a public right
of access to the courtroom, Justice Stewart's opinion expressly de-
clines to decide."1
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence rested on the type of pro-
ceeding that had been closed: pretrial rather than trial. 2
Justice Powell's concurrence agreed with the majority view of
the sixth amendment and went on to address the first amendment:
4. 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976).
5. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
6. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
7. "Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspec-
tion, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
8. 443 U.S. at 391.
9. Id. at 379.
10. Id. at 387.
11. Id. at 392.
12. Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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I would hold explicitly that petitioner's reporter had an interest
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in being
present at the pretrial suppression hearing. . . .The right of ac-
cess to courtroom proceedings, of course, is not absolute. It is
limited ...by the constitutional right of defendants to a fair
trial . . .
Justice Powell went on to say that the judge in Gannett struck the
balance correctly.1 4
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, like Justice Powell's, agreed
with the majority view of the sixth amendment and went on to
address the, first amendment.15 But, said Justice Rehnquist, the
first amendment guarantees nothing to the public; therefore, any
phase of a trial may be closed by the judge upon the participants'
request.16
Justice Blackmun's opinion, concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, urged
that the sixth amendment should be expanded beyond its textual
reference to the accused to include a public right of access to the
courtroom; further, the public's right ought to be outweighed by
considerations of the fairness of the trial only if "strictly and ines-
capably necessary.' 7
What then is a trial judge to do? Perhaps forgo reading the
Gannett opinions in favor of reading the newspapers. Exempli
gratia:
On August 8, 1979, Chief Justice Burger, interviewed by a
Gannett reporter, said, "The opinion referred to pretrial proceed-
ings only."' 8
On September 3, 1979, Justice Blackmun, addressing a judicial
conference in South Dakota, remarked, "Despite what my col-
league, the Chief Justice, has said", the case authorizes the closing
of all trials.' 9
On September 8, 1979, Justice Stevens, dedicating a new
building of the University of Arizona College of Law, said that
since "the normal reason for an in camera proceeding is to prevent
the jury from having access to inadmissible matter, that reason
13. Id. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 403.
15. Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 404.
17. Id. at 440 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, § A, at 17, col. 3.
19. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1979, § A, at 15, cols. 5-6.
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could not possibly motivate an order excluding the public from the
proceedings that take place in the presence of the jury."1
On August 13, 1979, Justice Powell, addressing the American
Bar Association in Dallas, suggested that judges might be a bit
premature in reading Gannett to permit exclusion of the press
from trials while allowing the general public to be present."
Of course, I don't know what trial judges have been read-
ing-the newspapers, the opinions, or nothing-but I do know that
there is a broad diversity of belief as to the reach of Gannett. One
state court judge in North Carolina has relied upon Gannett to
hold a secret trial." Another state court judge in Maryland closed
a pretrial hearing over the prosecutor's objection.23 Yet other state
court judges, in West Virginia'4 and in New York, 5 have barred
the press from the courtroom, but not the public.
And I, without the power or the inclination to bar anyone
from anything, stand before you charged with the responsibility of
explaining what it all means. The prudent thing would be for me
to confess at once that I do not know what it all means, retire to
my house in upstate New York, and get a few nights' sleep before
the crows come home to roost.
But I abjure prudence. I embrace audacity. I shall not retire,
and I shall impose upon your good nature yet a while more. I have
a case to tell you about which, it is not entirely impossible, may
furnish the beginnings of a key to help us decipher the coded mes-
sage of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.
The case is Matter of Torsney,' litigated through the New
York courts in 1979. It began on November 25, 1976, when New
York City police officer Robert Torsney shot and killed a young
black man, fifteen years old. Indicted for second degree murder,
Torsney admitted the act but defended on the ground of insanity.
At his trial, he called two witnesses to attest to his mental state-a
psychiatrist who testified that Torsney had a "psychosis associated
with epilepsy" in consequence of which he did not "know or appre-
ciate the nature, consequence and wrongfulness of his act," and a
psychologist who said that Torsney's conduct was consonant with
20. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1979, § A, at 41, col. 1.
21. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, § A, at 13, col. 4.
22. State v. Leger, No. 79 Cr. 6272 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 1979).
23. People v. Beachem, No. 22083 (Md. County Ct. July 13, 1979).
24. People v. Warth, No. 79-C13 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. July 24, 1979).
25., People v. Sullivan, No. 3721-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1979).
26. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
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the anxiety and bewilderment one would expect in an epileptic
equivalent.2 7
The prosecution also called two witnesses on the dispositive
issue-a psychiatrist who testified that Torsney was "prone to hys-
terical dissociation under stress" but was not psychotic and was
criminally responsible for his act, and a psychologist who said that
while Tornsey "might well have responded in an impulsive and
volatile manner to anticipated threat," there was little to indicate
"cognitive pathology, psychoses, or bizarre or disorganized intellec-
tive or emotional processes."'
On November 30, 1977, the jury found Torsney not guilty by
reason of mental illness or defect.
New York law provides for automatic commitment upon such
a verdict,2 9 and so, a week later, on December 6, 1977, Torsney was
admitted to the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center. On that day he
was examined by the psychiatrist in charge, who found him to be
without mental disorder. The next day the Center's psychologist,
after interviewing and testing Torsney, reported that Torsney was
a "somewhat rigid, impulsive individual" 80 who ought not to be a
policeman, but who did not suffer any psychosis, psychopathic dis-
order, or organic damage.
Over the next three months, Torsney was examined from time
to time by psychiatrists and psychologists, each and every one of
whom found him to be without mental illness.81
In March 1978, Torsney was transferred from the Mid-Hudson
Psychiatric Center to the Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, where
again he was found to be without mental illness. In April, the doc-
tors at Creedmoor recommended his release. A special release com-
mittee of three psychiatrists concluded unanimously that Torsney
was not psychotic, had no psychopathic or organic disorder, was
not a danger to himself or others, and ought to be released.
The Commissioner of Mental Hygiene convened an indepen-
dent review panel of two psychiatrists and a social worker. In July
1978, that panel recommended Torsney's release.
The matter came before an able justice of the Supreme Court,
which is New York's general jurisdiction trial court. He appointed
two more psychiatrists to examine Torsney. Each concluded that
27. Id. at 677, 394 N.E.2d at 268, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
28. Id.
29. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 330.20.1 (McKinney 1971).
30. 47 N.Y.2d at 678, 394 N.E.2d at 268, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
31. Id.
1980]
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Torsney was not a psychotic, not a lunatic, and not a psychopath.
The justice held a hearing. Eighteen witnesses agreed that
Torsney had no mental illness and could be released without en-
dangering himself or others. Not surprisingly, the court ordered
Torsney's discharge from Creedmoor, on condition that he not pos-
sess a gun, not be employed as a policeman, and make himself
available for out-patient care at the hospital. 2
The intermediate appellate court-the Appellate Divi-
sion-made up of five judges, unanimously reversed, 8 ordering
Torsney recommitted to Creedmoor and directing the Commis-
sioner of Mental Hygiene to prepare a program of psychiatric
treatment for Torsney. The Court of Appeals, by a vote of four to
three, reversed the Appellate Division, 4 and there the Torsney
case came to an end.
Reading over the opinions, packed with learning on the quan-
tum of evidence, burden of proof, presumption of sanity, and the
function of a commitment hearing, I cannot escape the sense that
what is before me is a code of some sort, embodying a message it
seems to be the effect of the code to conceal. In the very last para-
graph of the last opinion in the case, that of the dissenters in the
Court of Appeals, the veil is twitched to give us a glimpse of what
is truly at stake. After pages of procedural arcana, the dissenters
write:
[W]e agree, of course, that hospital confinement should never be
abused to deprive someone of his liberty unfairly. However,
when a person, driven by an explosive personality disorder, has
proven by an act of senseless violence that he is a menace to
others, so long as the psychological condition persists it is our
obligation to protect the public from the further acts of violence
that he may commit.8 '
In short, while on the face of it Matter of Torsney is about the
necessary quantum of evidence, burden of proof; et cetera, its real
significance involves the consequences that will attach in 1979 in
New York City to the unjustified killing of a black youth by a
white policeman. To some of the judges, those consequences must
include punishment of some kind, even though it takes the form of
confinement in a mental hospital. To other judges, perhaps, it is
32. Id. at 671, 394 N.E.2d at 263, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
33. 66 A.D.2d 281, 412 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1979).
34. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
35. Id. at 693, 394 N.E.2d at 277-78, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
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not acceptable that a man found by a jury on November 30 to have
been insane should be found by a psychiatrist one week later to be
entirely normal: surely the courtroom's process of finding facts is
less flimsy than that. To yet other judges, the case of People v.
Tornsey was merely a dispute of the sort modern life makes inevi-
table: let the jury resolve that dispute in compliance with the law,
and the courts have no further interest in the matter.
Do you see that the nature of Torsney's trial changes with the
viewpoint of the observer? The viewpoint is the unstated premise;
and, as different conclusions follow from different premises, so dif-
ferent conclusions will follow from different viewpoints. In the em-
pyrean of the ideal, there is a trial immutable and perfect, con-
stant no matter the intellect, temperament, tastes, or experience of
the man who contemplates it. In this sad world, however, the word
"trial" denotes not a single thing but rather a class of things, each
member in some respects like and in other respects unlike the rest
of the class. Do not speak to me, then, of a "trial." I can't be sure
what you mean. You convey insufficient information. Speak of the
trial in this case. Tell me all there is to tell about it. Make me
understand the kind of trial you take it to be, and I will have your
premise. From your premise I can follow you to your conclusions.
Ambiguities disappear. If the trial is just a way of resolving dis-
putes, the dispute's been resolved: set Torsney free. If it's a kind of
vent for outrage, punish him. If it's a method of ascertaining the
truth, the jury found him to be sick: treat him.
I think this may be the key to the code of Robert Torsney's
case. I wonder whether it might not also be the key to the problem
of the Gannett case. First, though, we must clear the foreground.
Beyond argument, at least for a while, is the proposition that
no public right of access to the courtroom may be found in the
sixth amendment.86 A majority of the Gannett court held that the
sixth amendment expresses a right belonging to the defendant
alone, and there the point must rest for now. 7 Whether such a
public right may be found in the first amendment is fairly subject
to argument, for a majority of the Gannett court reserved the
question. Since we American lawyers, accustomed to a written
Constitution, all too easily fall into the careless habit of debating
whether some given constitutional text does or does not guarantee
36. 443 U.S. at 387; id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
37. Id. at 387.
19801
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a right unmentioned in the text, I expect the argument to be about
whether the first amendment assures a right of public access to
judicial proceedings.88 We lawyers tend to forget that the words of
the amendment speak in the shortest form grammatically possible
and that they do not define or apply themselves. The question for
discussion, consequently, should not be whether the first amend-
ment does assure the right of public access. The question is
whether the right should be assured. In a manner of speaking, we
must forget the existence of the first amendment. We remember
that ours is a government in the tradition starting with Socrates
and extending through Milton, Jefferson, and Mill. We conclude
that the enlightenment of the populace is a necessary condition to
the proper administration of the public's business. We note, how-
ever, that popular enlightenment is not an all-justifying end. Some
things the people have no right to know, and only a fanatic would
argue the contrary. The deliberations of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court ought not to be covered by the Washington Post.9
My income tax return is no business of the New York Times. Al-
though Jacqueline Kennedy and Aristotle Onassis were undoubt-
edly a couple of interest to the public, their bedroom on their wed-
ding night would be no place for a reporter from the National
Enquirer.
So much for clearing the foreground. Now to the center of the
composition. What is there to think about in trying to decide
whether there should be a right of public access to the courtroom?
What are the elements which come together in proportions varying
in each instance but which collectively go by the name of "a trial"?
What are the various viewpoints on the nature of a trial from each
of which different conclusions may follow on the still-vexed subject
of free press/fair trial?
First. All trials take place in a courtroom, an institution of
government paid for with the public's money. The public thus has
an interest in observing the operation of the institution, in know-
ing how its money is spent. This interest exists for every
trial-civil or criminal, jury or nonjury, state or federal-but will
count for much or for little depending on the weight assigned to
the other factors.
Second. Every trial takes place because there is a dispute to
be resolved. Given a case in which the resolution of a dispute is the
38. See 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
39. But see generally B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
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IN SEARCH OF PREMISES
sole or principal purpose to be served, one might well conclude
that the importance of publicity is too slight to justify a judge's
denial of the parties' request that the doors be closed. Even adding
in the first factor, the public's interest in seeing how its money is
spent, the result is unchanged. The parties' desire for privacy so
outweighs any public interest in observing the proceedings that the
latter approaches the vanishing point.
Third. Some trials feature, as an aspect of the dispute to be
resolved, the need to distribute the public's money or allocate
some other public good-the adjudication of a Social Security
claim, for example, or a challenge to the fairness of a civil service
examination. 40 Given the relationship between an enlightened pop-
ulace and the proper administration of the public's business, noted
above, this third element will, where present, count heavily on the
side of a general right to know.
Fourth. In many trials, what is chiefly involved is the assertion
against the individual of the power of government. Since the asser-
tion against the individual of the power of government is tyranny
incipient, I should think it obvious that secret proceedings in this
sort of case would be hateful to all believers in constitutionalism.
Fifth. I now make the obligatory reference to Tocqueville's
Democracy in America.41 In the United States, remarked the great
Frenchman 150 years ago, virtually all political questions become
legal questions and are decided by judges. So it is that in some
trials the court performs political functions, which in less happy
places are performed at best in the legislature, at worst on the bar-
ricades.4' Should a lawsuit have a substantial political element,
self-evidently in America the public and the press should be
welcome.4"
Sixth. Some people think that a trial is a method of determin-
ing the truth. I think that belief ill-informed. A trial is only in
part, frequently in small part, a method of determining the truth.
In assessing the weight assigned to this truth-determining func-
tion, one looks, I suppose, to the public importance of the "truth"
being determined. Whether the transactions between Supplier Sam
40. An early and scholarly effort to examine law in terms of social interests is Pound, A
Survey of Social Interests, 67 HAsv. L. Rv. 1 (1943).
41. A. DE TocQuVLL, DEMOCRACY IN AMEICA (R. Heffner ed. 1950).
42. For two famous cases in which the courts have performed political functions, see
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. See generally McConnell, Political Trials East and West, 40 SASK. L. Rav. 131
(1975).
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and Customer Charlie amount to a running account or an account
stated, for example, is a question of little or no public importance.
Whether Whittaker Chambers' allegations about Alger Hiss are
true, is a different matter entirely."
To recapitulate: I believe that these six ways of looking at a
trial permit a court to measure the importance of public access
more precisely than do the unduly general formulations to be
found in the Supreme Court's opinions. If they indeed possess this
virtue, it is because they focus not upon "a trial," but upon the
different things a trial in our system may be. They lay bare, in
short, the viewpoints, the premises which usually go unstated and
therefore lead to difficulties and confusion.
I turn now to a final aspect of trials, one I have not so far
mentioned but which figures largely in the decisions. This is the
litigant's interest, usually the interest of the defendant in a crimi-
nal case, in a fair trial. How is the defendant's interest to be ac-
commodated with what may be a considerable public interest in
the openness of the proceeding?
I try to answer that question with trepidation, doubtful that I
will manage to convey my meaning with any exactitude and confi-
dent that, whatever I do, I shall be misunderstood. Recall with me
the opinions of the psychiatrists and psychologists in the Robert
Torsney case."5 He was without psychotic disorder, free of bizarre
or disorganized intellective processes, not a danger to himself or
others. But he had, on a street in Brooklyn, taken out his .38 police
special and calmly shot to death a youngster who was taking a
walk with his aunt. The lesson, I intimate, is that we not accept
with undue solemnity the assertions by which we disguise our igno-
rance. The trial of a lawsuit, I whisper, involves a host of matters
about many or most of which in fact we know nothing. In the law
generally, I breathe in your ear, we deal much of the time in polite
fictions which we pretend to believe are true simply because other-
wise we could not function but which, in that desperate 2 a.m. of
the soul we all sometimes experience, we must admit are nothing
more than shots in the dark.
A homely example. Is there a single person in this room who
does not have in wallet or purse a driver's license? Think of the
44. W. CHAMBERS, WITNESS (1952); see United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1950), af'd per curiam, 345 U.S. 942 (1952). See generally W. Jowirr, THE STRANGE CASE
OF ALGER Hiss (1953); R. SETH, THE SLEEPING TRUTH: THE HISS-CHAMBERS AFFAIR RE-
APPRAISED (1968); J. SMITH, ALGER Hiss, THE TRUE STORY (1976).
45. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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enormous apparatus in each of the states devoted to administering
the statutes on drivers' licenses. Why do we require such licenses?
Why, mainly to assure the competence of drivers, we answer; and I
submit that there is nothing, no shred of evidence, to show that
the requirement that drivers be licensed does one whit to assure
their competence. While most of us would not dream of driving if
we did not know how, whether or not a license were needed, a few
of us will drive no matter what, with or without a license.
Now, how about Robert Torsney? What explains him? Per-
haps Shakespeare or Dostoyevsky knew,4 but certainly not the
psychiatrists and psychologists who purport to understand him,
change him, cure him, speak some sort of ascertainable truth about
him. The jargon at Torsney's trial and later hearings was absurd,
and my speculation is whether "absurd" is not the word to de-
scribe the reasons so solemnly adumbrated by judges both high
and low to explain why some proceedings should be closed to the
public. Because jurors will be improperly affected by what they
read or hear, we are told. And judges will not be? Are the man and
woman in the street really so flammable as that, and the man or
woman in the black robe so incombustible? Do people really re-
member everything they have read in the paper about a case or
seen on television when, weeks, months, or years later, they are
summoned to serve as jurors in that case? With respect, even if
they do remember it, are people so quick to believe it? Do most
people not know what I assume all of us know, that much of what
the media report is false, incorrect, misleading, incomplete, or dis-
torted? If a judge points these things out to jurors and tells them,
so long as they are jurors, not to read newspaper accounts of the
case or listen to broadcast coverage of it, will the jurors not com-
ply? Is it so, in sum, that closing the courtroom is the only way to
assure a fair trial? I know the courts say it. But is it so?
It must be understood, ladies and gentlemen, that these words
of mine are anything but last words. I do not even pretend that
they have any particular value. The only claim I make for them is
that conceivably they point to some of the things judges might
think about when asked to close a courtroom to the public. I con-
fess to harboring a simpleton's faith in the power of drawing dis-
tinctions to help you say exactly what you mean. In that faith, I
declare my firm belief that some day the Supreme Court will de-
46. See, e.g., W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO (1604); F. DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT (1866).
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cide a case on the relation between free press and fair trial which
reminds me not at all of what I hear in the oak tree outside my
bedroom window at dawn from April to October.
